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Are Underground Workers More Likely
To Be Underground Consumers?*
Bernard Fortin , Guy Lacroix , Claude Montmarquette† ‡ §
Résumé / Abstract
Cet article étudie les effets du travail au noir sur le niveau des achats
au noir des individus. On montre qu’il peut se décomposer en un effet de réseau,
un effet de non-séparabilité et un effet revenu. Notre analyse empirique utilise
des micro-données tirées d’une enquête réalisée au Québec pour l’année 1993.
La méthode des moments généralisés nous permet de tenir compte de la censure
et des erreurs de mesure sur la variable dépendante ainsi que de l’endogénéité
des variables d’offre de travail qui conditionnent les décisions de consommation.
Selon nos résultats, une hausse de l’offre de travail au noir accroît de façon
importante le niveau des dépenses au noir. Cet effet amplifie l’impact des
politiques de taxation et de contrôle fiscal sur la taille de l’économie souterraine.
This paper investigates the effect of working in the underground
sector on the level of individual underground expenditures. We show that it can
be decomposed into a network effect, a non-separability effect and an income
effect. Our empirical analysis uses micro data from a randomized survey
conducted in the province of Québec for 1993. GMM methods allow us to take
into account censoring and measurement error on the dependent variable as
well as the possible endogeneity of the conditioning labor supply variables. We
find that an increase in the underground labor supply has a strong positive
effect on the level of underground expenditures. This relationship amplifies the
impact of tax policy and of the enforcement system on the size of the
underground economy.
Mots Clés : Consommation au noir, travail au noir, séparabilité, impact des
politiques, estimations par la méthode des moments généralisés
Keywords : Underground consumption, underground work, separability,
policy impacts, GMM estimations
1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that one major eect of income taxation is to
stimulate activities in the so-called underground or irregular economy.
Recently, a number of microeconometric studies have attempted to esti-
mate the impact of income tax policies on hours of work in the irregular
sector. Lacroix and Fortin (1992) have estimated a system of simultane-
ous labor supply equations in the regular and irregular sectors based on
a tax evasion theoretical framework [e.g., see Sandmo (1981) and Cowell
(1985)]. They showed that an increase in marginal income tax rates leads
to increased hours in the irregular sector and to reduced hours in the
regular sector, for those participating in both sectors. Lemieux, Fortin
and Frechette (LFF, 1994) estimated a model a la Gronau (1977) of the
allocation of time between regular and irregular sectors. They concluded
that taxes distort labor-market activities away from the regular sector to
the underground economy. The distortion was found to be particularly
large for specic groups of the population such as welfare claimants.
While these studies provide some information on the supply side of
the irregular sector, surprisingly little is known about the factors in-
uencing the demand for goods and services produced in that sector.
1
However, ignoring the demand side may produce dramatically biased es-
timates of responses to tax or enforcement policies. Thus, one can expect
that individuals working in the underground sector are more likely to be
underground consumers than individuals who do not work in the under-
ground sector, ceteris paribus. This would generate a positive correlation
between changes in the supply and changes in the demand of goods and
services in the underground sector. In this event, one expects that an
increase in marginal tax rates, which encourages more people to work
in the underground sector, will have a larger impact on the size of the
underground sector than otherwise.
2
Conversely, the negative eects of
enforcement policies (e.g., more severe controls or larger penalties on tax
evaders) on the importance of the underground sector will be enhanced.
There are a number of reasons why individual hours of work and
purchases in the underground sector are likely to be positively related
1
One exception is Pestieau (1985) who provided a logit estimation of the deter-
minants of the demand for undeclared services in Belgium, based on survey data. In
particular, his results show that it increases with age and income. However, he does
not take into account the endogeneity of income and his model is not based on a
utility-theoretic approach.
2
Of course, in a general equilibrium framework, the analysis would also have to
take into account other factors such as the composition of additional government
expenditures generated by the taxes increase, changes in relative wages and prices,
income eects, etc. [see Cowell (1990)].
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(even after controlling for the level of disposable income and for other
observable characteristics). A rst reason is that individuals working in
the underground sector may have better access to that sector's output
[Kesselman (1989)]. It is thus possible that underground workers benet
from information on the availability of goods and services produced in
the irregular sector. This \network eect" is likely to lower search costs
and to induce these workers to increase their purchases of underground
commodities. Second, preferences over goods and services in the under-
ground sector may be non-separable from labor supply in that sector.
A familiar example is the demand for undeclared housework services or
home improvement for those underground workers who have few hours
available to spend on these activities. Third, the income eect of working
in the underground sector may increase the demand for some undeclared
goods and services (e.g., baby-sitting services). However, the income
eect may also decrease the demand for some (inferior) undeclared com-
modities in favor of commodities produced in the regular sector. Fourth,
some people may be engaged in barter of goods and services produced
informally for home consumption [Kesselman (1989)]. Finally, unob-
servable individual characteristics may inuence both consumption and
labor supply in the underground sector in the same direction (e.g., low
level of morality, dissatisfaction with government intervention, culture
of tax evasion, etc.).
This paper provides strong evidence in support of a positive corre-
lation between purchases of irregular commodities and hours of work in
the irregular sector. Our data show that workers involved in the under-
ground sector spend six times as much on irregular commodities than
those who are not involved. Moreover, the econometric analysis pre-
sented below concludes that hours of work in the underground sector
have a strong eect on the consumption of irregular goods and services.
More generally, this paper provide estimates of the demand for goods
and services in the underground sector using micro data from a recent
survey conducted in the Province of Quebec.
3
The survey was conducted
in 1994 and includes over 5,000 adults 18 years and over. It is similar
to another survey conducted in 1986 (see LFF, 1994) but covers a much
wider geographic area.
For estimation purposes, we include hours of work in both the regular
and irregular sectors as explanatory variables while allowing for possible
endogeneity.
4
This conditional approach, developed by Browning and
3
See Fortin et al. (1996) for a description of the data set.
4
Due to lack of observations, we could not estimate a system of demand for de-
clared and undeclared goods and services. Instead, we estimate an equation for total
expenditures in the underground sector, acknowledging some aggregation problems.
2
Meghir (1991), has many advantages over the standard unconditional
approach in which labor supply and commodity demand functions are
estimated simultaneously. In particular, we do not have to specify the
equations for the labor supply in each sector since our estimates are not
aected by the choice of these specications. This also implies that we
do not have to estimate the impact of the income tax schedules on labor
supplies, which is usually a highly complex task. Furthermore, we do
not have to estimate a model in which the individual has some inuence
on the consumer price of undeclared goods, due to the presence of a
network eect which is dependent on time worked in the underground
sector. This is so because our estimates are conditional on hours worked
in the irregular sector. Finally, including hours of work in each sector
as explanatory variables is required to get consistent estimates of the
Engel curve for irregular expenditures, so long as the latter are aected
by these variables.
The model is estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) applied to a censored normal regression model with endogenous
explanatory variables. Our approach extends Stapleton and Young's
(1984) estimators based on either the expectation function or the condi-
tional expectation function for uncensored observations on the dependent
variable. The main advantage of these estimators over conventional tobit
estimators is that they are robust to measurement error on the positive
values of the dependent variable. Indeed, survey data on the reported
positive amount of undeclared goods and services are likely to be sub-
ject to serious measurement problems. For instance, individuals may be
willing to report that they have purchased irregular commodities, while
being reluctant (or unable) to report the exact amount actually bought.
In Section 2, we discuss the survey and provide descriptive statistics
of our sample data in support of our hypothesis. In Section 3, we provide
a simple theoretical model of the demand for irregular goods and ser-
vices that takes into account the network eect. Section 4 discusses the
econometric methodology used to estimate the model. Section 5 presents
the empirical variables and reports our main econometric ndings. In
Section 6, we consider some policy simulations. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Survey and Descriptive Results
Obtaining reliable micro data about sensitive behavioral aspects requires
the use of carefully tested methods. Accordingly, the data used in this
Moreover, price eects could not be estimated since we use cross-sectional data and
we have no information on prices in the underground sector.
3
paper, which are derived from a survey conducted in spring 1994 for the
year 1993, follows very closely the approach described in LFF. Both our
questionnaire and sample design are largely inspired by the ones they
used. In addition to traditional questions on socioeconomic character-
istics, our questionnaire includes numerous questions on underground
labor activities and about expenditures on commodities in the under-
ground sector. The term \underground" (that is never used in the sur-
vey) refers to (mostly legal) economic activities that generate income
hidden to the tax authorities. The questionnaire also includes ques-
tions on labor activities in the regular sector, on nonwage income and
on perceptions and attitudes of respondents towards taxes and irregular
activities.
As regards the sample design, 2 940 households were sampled in
the Province of Quebec. These households yielded 5 132 individuals 18
years and over, compared to 2 134 in LFF. While the survey described
by LFF was limited to the region of Quebec City, three regions were
covered in our survey: the metropolitan areas of Quebec City (2 014
individuals), Montreal (2 035 individuals) and the region of \Bas St-
Laurent" (1 093 individuals). Montreal is the most industrialized region
of the Province and by far the most populated. Quebec City hosts the
provincial government, and the \Bas St-Laurent" region is an amalgam
of small villages and cities in a semi-urban or rural environment. The
sample methodology is based on the random-cluster approach used by
Statistics Canada in its Labor Force Survey.
The survey was conducted by a well known polling agency in Que-
bec (Leger & Leger). Interviewers were trained to emphasize the strictly
scientic purpose of the survey and to highlight the anonymous and con-
dential character of the collected data. Each respondent who accepted
to ll a questionnaire received an amount of $5 (Can). The respondents
were asked to put the lled questionnaire in a sealed envelope that was
picked up a day later.
Our sample design produced an overall rate of response (53%) very
closed to the one reported in LFF (51.7%). As discussed in detail in
Fortin et al. (p. 21-23, 1996), the socioeconomic characteristics of
our sample are, in general, similar to those observed in the Statistics
Canada's Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) for 1993 and for the same
regions. While the respondents of our survey are slightly younger and
more educated than those from the SCF, the proportion of men and
women are similar in both surveys. Moreover, the industrial distribu-
tion of jobs held by respondents are also comparable. These results tend
4
to conrm the representativeness of our sample. Fortin et al. (1994) also
provides a number of tests that corroborate the reliability of the data.
5
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the relationship between
purchases of commodities in the underground economy and labor status
vis-a-vis the underground and regular labor markets. The sample we
utilize excludes two-parent households since our model of demand for
irregular commodities does not take into account interactions between
members within the household.
6
The sample includes 1 569 individu-
als of which 236 (that is, 15%) purchased irregular commodities in 1993
(see the last line of Table 1). The average total purchases of irregular
commodities by individuals who did not work in the underground sector
(1 440 individuals) is $136 (Can), while it amounts to $817 for the 129
individuals who worked in the underground sector [see columns (1) and
(2)]. Thus, the total purchases of underground commodities by under-
ground workers were about 6 times larger, on average, than those made
by the individuals who did not work in the underground sector. We now
focus on the subsample of individuals who purchased a positive amount
of irregular commodities (the restricted sample). The 53 individuals who
worked in the underground sector spent 1.85 times as much on irregular
goods and services than those who did not ($1 990 vs $1 071).
In comparison, the level of expenditures in the underground sector
is much less related to hours worked in the regular sector. Indeed, the
average total expenditures on irregular commodities is $162 for the 577
individuals who did not work in the regular sector and amounts to $209
for the 992 individuals who did. Thus, the ratio in their case is only 1.29.
Moreover, amongst the consumers of irregular commodities, the average
level of expenditures for the individuals who did not work in the regular
market (62) is $1507 while it amounts to $1 196 for the 174 individuals
who did (a dierence of 26%, that time, in favor of those who did not
wok in the regular sector).
While informative, this descriptive analysis must be interpreted with
care since other variables that may aect the level of purchases are not
controlled (e.g., gender or the level of disposable income). Furthermore,
one must take into account the fact that hours of work in each sector
are endogenous variables. Finally, expenditures on goods and services in
the underground sector is a censored variable and this must also be con-
5
They also present a descriptive analysis of the results of the survey as well as a
comparison of the underground economy in the Province of Quebec in 1985 and 1993,
based on extrapolations from data on the Region of Quebec in the two surveys.
6
See Browning et al. (1994) for a collective model of the intra-household allocation
of consumption. Estimating a model of the demand for irregular commodities along
these lines is beyond the scope of this paper.
5
sidered in the econometric analysis. The next sections aim at presenting
and estimating a model of demand for irregular goods and services that
address these various issues.
3 A Model of Demand for Irregular Com-
modities
Our model is based on the standard tax evasion model with endogenous
variables [see Cowell (1985)]. To simplify the presentation, we limit the
analysis to income tax evasion.
7
We introduce a network eect into the
model by assuming that individuals face a marginal cost of access to
irregular goods and services which is a function of a set of exogenous
variables, and is decreasing with the level of hours worked in the under-
ground sector.
8
The basic argument here is that a side eect of working
in the underground economy is to provide more information about sell-
ers in the underground markets and thus to reduce the cost of access to
irregular commodities. Our model also allows for imperfect substitution
between regular and irregular goods and services. Even where regular
and irregular sectors appear to produce the same commodity, regular
output is likely to be preferred to irregular one on account of better
reputation, warranty policy, follow-up service, return policy, etc.
On the income side, working in the irregular labor market involves a
risk of being caught and having to pay a penalty that is a positive func-
tion of unpaid income taxes. However the individual has the possibility
of reducing the probability of being detected by investing resources to
hide his irregular working activities. In our model, the risk is limited
to the supply side of the underground economy, since, as a buyer, an
individual is not responsible under current law for unpaid income or
consumption taxes.
9
Assume two states of nature. With probability p 2 [0; 1], an indi-
vidual is audited by the tax authorities and must pay a penalty on any
unpaid income taxes. With probability 1 p, he is not audited and avoids
7
Sales taxes such as the federal Goods and Services Tax (GST) and the provincial
Taxe de Vente du Quebec (TVQ) are not explicitly modeled since their tax rates are
xed in our cross-sectional sample.
8
An earlier version of the model also allowed for a xed eect of participating in
the underground sector on the cost of access to irregular commodities. However this
eect was found not to be statistically signicant.
9
One could generalize the model to account for the fact that an individual who
hires workers (thus a buyer of labor services) is responsible for the remittance of
various payroll taxes to the government, and thus may choose to evade these taxes.
However, this would make the model more complex without changing its basic results.
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all penalties. Assume further that the probability of being audited is in-
creasing with underground labor income, y
u
= w
u
h
u
, where w
u
and h
u
are respectively the individual's wage rate and his hours worked in the
underground sector. This probability is also decreasing with the level of
resources, R, devoted by the individual to hide his underground working
activities and a function of a vector z
1
of exogenous variables (which
includes the penalty rate):
p = max [0; p

(y
u
; R; z
1
)]; (1)
with p

() < 1, @p

=@y
u
> 0, @p

=@R < 0, p

(0; 0; z
1
) = 0 and with
p

(y
u
; R; z
1
) strictly quasi-convex in (y
u
; R).
To simplify, we also assume that the penalty rate is suciently high
so that it is optimal for an underground worker to devote the minimum
amount of resources required to make the probability of being audited
equal to zero. Under this assumption, the problem becomes one with
perfect certainty.
10
Letting p

(y
u
; R; z
1
) = 0 and solving for R yields:
R = R (y
u
; z
1
); (2)
with R(0; z
1
) = 0, @R=@y
u
> 0 and @
2
R=@y
u
2
> 0. Equation (2) indi-
cates that the minimum amount of resources needed by the individual to
be sure he will not be caught, is increasing at an increasing rate with his
labor income in the underground sector, y
u
, given the level of exogenous
variables, z
1
.
The marginal (and average) cost of access to underground commodi-
ties, c, is a decreasing function of hours worked in the underground
sector, h
u
, and a function of a vector of exogenous variables, z
2
:
c = c (h
u
; z
2
); (3)
with @c=@h
u
< 0.
Using equations (2) and (3) and the denition of underground labor
income, the individual's budget constraint therefore is:
P
r
C
r
+ (P
u
+ c(h
u
; z
2
))C
u
= w
u
h
u
+ (w
r
h
r
+ y) (1  t)  R(w
u
h
u
; z
1
);
(4)
10
This concealment cost approach is thus consistent with the standard tax evasion
model (Cowell, 1991). The assumption that tax evasion entails real or psychic costs
while being foolproof has been used recently by authors dissatised with the lack
of predictive power of models based on risk aversion [e.g., see Usher (1986), Kessel-
man (1989), Fortin, Marceau and Savard (1997)]. Note that the model does not
predict that no underground worker will be controlled since p refers to the subjective
probability of being controlled, which may dier from the true probability.
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where subscripts r and u stand for the regular and the underground
sectors, respectively; P
i
is the price of goods or services in sector i, C
i
is the consumption of goods and services in sector i, w
i
is the wage rate
in sector i and h
i
is the hours of work in sector i, for i = u; r; y is
the nonwage income and t is the (proportional) income tax rate. The
individual is assumed to have no inuence on the prices of commodities
in each sector, P
r
and P
u
, where P
r
is gross of the sales taxes. However,
since the cost of access to underground commodities depends on a choice
variable, the price of irregular commodities gross of the marginal access
cost to the irregular sector, is an endogenous variable.
11
Preferences over all goods are represented by the utility function
U(C
r
; C
u
; h
r
; h
u
; z
3
), where z
3
is a vector of demographic variables inu-
encing preferences. The individual is thus assumed to solve the following
program:
max
fC
r
;C
u
;h
r
;h
r
g
U(C
r
; C
u
; h
r
; h
u
; z
3
); (5)
subject to equation (4) and to the non-negativity constraints on the
choice variables.
12
The unconditional demand functions for regular and underground
commodities, and the labor supply for both markets can be derived from
the rst-order conditions to this program. However, since we want to
estimate the relationship between hours of work in each sector and the
demand for undeclared goods and services, it is more appropriate, fol-
lowing Browning and Meghir (1991), to adopt the conditional demand
approach. For this matter, we rst derive the demand function for un-
declared commodities conditional on the hours of work in each sector
(the conditioning goods) and on total expenditures on both declared
and undeclared commodities. Interestingly, the functional form for this
demand equation does not depend upon whether the hours of work are
zero or positive
13
. Moreover, it holds even when hours of work are ra-
tioned in one or both sectors. Setting hours of work at levels h
u
and h
r
,
the program to be solved is now:
11
It would be easy to generalize the model to allow the marginal cost of access
to underground commodities to depend on the level of consumption of underground
commodities. However, this would make comparative static results more dicult to
interpret.
12
Barter of goods and services produced informally is not modeled since it repre-
sents less than 6% of the size of underground economy in our sample.
13
On the contrary, it is clear, from Kuhn-Tucker conditions, that the functional
form for the unconditional demand for irregular commodities will vary depending
upon whether the individual works or not in each market, which makes the estimation
of the model much more complex to perform [e.g., see Wales and Woodland (1983)].
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max
fC
r
;C
u
g
U(C
r
; C
u
;h
r
; h
u
; z
3
); (6)
subject to
P
r
C
r
+ (P
u
+ c(h
u
; z
2
))C
u
= m;
where m is the level of total expenditures on commodities, as given by
the right-hand side of equation (4),
14
and subject to the non-negativity
constraints on C
r
and C
u
. The rst-order conditions for an interior
solution to this program yield the conditional demand for undeclared
goods and services:
15
C
u
=

C
u
(P
r
; P
u
+ c(h
u
; z
2
); m;h
u
; h
r
; z
3
) : (7)
Dierentiating equation (7) with respect to h
u
and using the deni-
tion of m, it is possible to decompose the eect of an increase in hours
of work in the irregular sector on the demand for irregular commodi-
ties into three separate eects: a network eect, an income eect and
a non-separability eect. They correspond to the three terms on the
right-hand side of the following equation:
@C
u
=@h
u
= @

C
u
=@
~
P
u
@c=@h
u
+ @

C
u
=@ m w
u
(1 @R=@y
u
) + @

C
u
=@h
u
;
(8)
where
~
P
u
= P
u
+ c(h
u
; z
2
). The rst term, corresponding to the network
eect, will be positive as long as the output from the irregular sector
is not a Gien good. The second term, which reects an income eect,
will also be positive as long as the latter output is not an inferior good
and that w
u
(1 @R=@y
u
) > 0. This latter expression corresponds to the
underground wage rate net of the marginal cost of hours of work in the
underground sector (in terms of resources needed to hide underground
income). The non-separability eect, as expressed by the third term,
requires more explanation. Leaving aside the network and income eects,
one can show that the hours of work in the irregular sector will have
no eect on the demand for irregular commodities, as long as labor
supplies (i.e., the conditioning goods) and commodity demands (i.e., the
14
In our static model which ignores saving, total expenditures on regular and ir-
regular commodities are equal to the net disposable income. Note also that the
net disposable income may incorporate a non-linear tax-transfer system, since our
analysis is conditional on m.
15
One can also derive this conditional demand function from a dual approach based
on the conditional cost function [e.g., see Browning (1983)].
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conditioned goods) are weakly separable.
16
This will be the case if the
utility function can be written in the form F (u(C
r
; C
u
; z
3
); h
r
; h
u
; z
3
).
Therefore, under weak separability the third term on the right-hand
side of equation (8) will be equal to zero. A positive (negative) term
indicates that hours of work in the irregular sector and consumption in
the irregular sector are complements (substitutes).
17
A similar analysis can be used to study the impact of hours of work
in the regular sector on the demand for irregular commodities. Dier-
entiating equation (7) with respect to h
r
and using the denition of m,
one gets:
@C
u
=@h
r
= @

C
u
=@ m w
r
(1  t) + @

C
u
=@h
r
: (9)
As shown in equation (9), there are only two eects when a change
in hours of work in the regular sector occurs: an income eect and a
non-separability eect. This result stems for the fact that the network
eect is ruled out in the case of a change in h
r
since it is assumed that
sellers of goods and services in the regular sector can easily be found.
Ideally, one would like to estimate the conditional demand for ir-
regular commodities, as given by equation (7). However, it cannot be
estimated since we have no information on the marginal cost of access
to irregular commodities, c. Similarly, no information is available on the
cost of hiding underground working activities, R. Therefore, we must
estimate a quasi-reduced form of the conditional demand function, as
obtained from equation (7) and with the use of the gross disposable
income, m, (with m = m + R(y
u
; z
1
)):
C
u
= C
u
(h
u
; h
r
;m; z) ; (10)
where z is the vector of exogenous variables (z = (z
1
; z
2
; z
3
)) and where
the prices P
r
and P
u
have been normalized to one.
The objective of our econometric analysis is to estimate equation
(10), where C
u
can be interpreted as total expenditures in the irregular
sector (since P
u
= 1). Note that in this equation, the impact of h
u
on the
demand for irregular commodities takes into account the network eect,
the non-separability eect and a \resource"eect, that is, the income
eect associated with a change in the resources used to hide irregular
activities. Therefore, it will not be possible to estimate these three eects
separately. Moreover, as long as the size of the non-separability eects
16
This result is an application of a theorem by Pollak (1971).
17
The relationship between this denition of complements (substitutes) and the
standard one based on the sign of cross compensated eects is provided in Neary and
Roberts (1980).
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associated with a change in h
u
and in h
r
are similar and that the resource
eect is small, the impact of a change in h
u
will exceed that of a change
in h
r
. This result, which is due to the network eect, will be tested in
the econometric section.
4 Econometric Issues
It is natural to estimate the conditional demand for irregular commodi-
ties using an instrumental variable (IV) approach, given that the hours
of work in each sector and the disposable income are potentially endoge-
nous [see Browning and Meghir, (1991)]. Moreover using an IV approach
does not require us to specify the labor supply equations. However, one
must take into account the fact the dependent variable, C
u
, is censored
at zero. Consider the following latent variable model for individual i:
C

ui
= 
0
x
i
+ 
i
; (11)
where  is a vector of parameters to be estimated, x
i
is the vector of
explanatory variables, some of which are potentially endogenous, 
i
is
an error term  N(0; 
2
), and C

ui
is the latent variable to be explained.
While the value of C

ui
is not observable, an indicator function C
ui
is
observed and is related to C

ui
in the following manner:
C
ui
=

C

ui
if C

ui
> 0
0 otherwise
Estimating equation (11) using GMM is motivated by the fact that
the standard tobit model can be estimated consistently using a Nonlinear
Least Squares (NLLS) method. Two general classes of estimators are
available for this purpose: estimators based on either the expectation
function (EF) of C
ui
or the expectation function of C
ui
conditional on
C

ui
> 0 (CEF). Moreover, as shown by Stapleton and Young (1984),
the EF and the CEF expectation estimators are robust to measurement
error on the positive value of the dependent variable, which is not the
case for the standard maximum likelihood (ML) estimator of the tobit
model.
18
18
The reason why the standard ML estimator is not consistent in the presence of
measurement error is that the estimator of the auxiliary parameter, the variance of
the error term, is based in part on the variance of the dependent variable. Since
measurement error increases this variance, its estimator is biased upward and this
bias is transmitted to the coecient estimators. On the contrary, measurement error
does not aect the consistency of EF or CEF estimators since no parameters from
the (unspecied) distribution of the measurement appear in the EF or in the CEF.
11
The EF of C
ui
, given x
i
, is (see Amemiya 1985, p. 368):
E(C
ui
j x
i
) = ()
0
x
i
+ ()  F (x
i
; ); (12)
where () and () are respectively the density and the cumulative
functions of the standard normal distribution, evaluated at 
0
x
i
=, and
where  = (
0
; )
0
.
On the other hand, the CEF of C
ui
, given x
i
, is given by (see
Amemiya 1985, p. 367):
E(C
ui
j C
ui
> 0; x
i
) = 
0
x
i
+ 
()
()
 F
c
(x
i
; ); (13)
where ()=() is Mills' ratio. From equations (12) and (13), both the
EF and the CEF of C
ui
are nonlinear functions of  and . Naturally,
NLLS estimates of these equations are inappropriate if any of the x
i
are endogenous. We therefore rely on GMM estimates with White's
correction for heteroskedasticity. More specically, let us focus on the
model based on the EF of the dependent variable. It is specied as:
C
ui
= ()
0
x
i
+ () + 
i
(14)
where, by equation (12), E(
i
j x
i
) = 0. Now, dene F (x; ) as the
mean function of the vector of observations on consumption, C
u
, where
x is the matrix of observations on explanatory variables. Given a set of
instrumentsW satisfying the moment conditions E[C
ui
  F (x
i
; )]W
i
=
0, the GMM estimator for , in the case where there are more moment
conditions than there are parameters to estimate, is chosen to minimize:
[C
u
  F (x; )]
0
W (W
0

W )
 1
W
0
[C
u
  F (x; )]; (15)
where (W
0

W ) is the covariance matrix of W
0
[C
u
  F (x; )]. The diag-
onal matrix 
 is not observable. However, it can be approximated by a
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator (HCCME)
^

,
of which the i
th
diagonal element is given by ^
2
i
= [C
ui
 F (x
i
;
^
)]
2
, where
^
 is obtained in a rst step using a nonlinear instrumental estimation.
The latter consists of minimizing equation (15) with 
 being replaced
by the identity matrix [see White (1980)].
While the estimator of  obtained using the HCCME
^

 has good
asymptotic properties, it is possible to modify it so that it has better
nite-sample properties. MacKinnon and White (1985) concluded that
a dierent HCCME (denoted
~

) generally seems to perform better in
Of course, these estimators are asymptotically less ecient than a correctly specied
ML estimator, but the latter requires the specication of the measurement error.
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Monte Carlo experiments. The i
th
diagonal element of this HCCME is
given by ^
i
2
=(1  
^
h
i
)
2
, where
^
h
i
= f
i
(f
0
f)
 1
f
i
0
is the i
th
diagonal of the
\hat" matrix
^
P
f
that projects orthogonally onto the space spanned by
the columns of f , with f = @F (x; )=@ j
=
^

.
Following an iteration process suggested by Mackinnon and Davidson
(1993), equation (15) is rst minimized starting with 
 = I ; next we
compute
~

 and minimize (15) again. Upon convergence, we compute
~


with the new set of parameter estimates and minimize again (15) until
both
~

 and
~
 converge to stable values. The covariance matrix of
~
 is
then estimated as:
(
~
f)
0
W (W
0
~

W )
 1
W
0
(
~
f): (16)
where
~
f = @F (x; )=@ j
=
~

:
A similar approach is used to estimate the model based on the CEF
of the dependent variable. In this case, the function F
c
(x; ), as dened
in equation (13), is substituted for F (x; ) in equation (15).
5 Empirical Results
Since there are three potentially endogenous variables in the conditional
demand equation (10), we need at least three identifying restrictions.
This raises the issue of the choice of instruments. Unfortunately, eco-
nomic theory does not have much to say about this. Browning and
Meghir (1991), in their analysis of a household demand system condi-
tional upon hours of work and labor participation of the husband and
wife, use, among others, asset income, education, male age and nonlin-
ear combinations of these variables as instruments. They argue that the
exclusion of asset income is in line with a two-stage budgeting approach
while education is a proxy for the wage rate (not available for individuals
who do not work). They also provide overidentifying tests to evaluate
the validity of their exclusion restrictions. Our strategy closely follows
their approach. The complete list of instruments we use is nonlabor in-
come (NLINC)
19
, nonlabor income squared, dummies for primary ed-
ucation (PRIMEDU), for college (high school) education (COLEDU)
and for university education (UNIV EDU), experience (EXP), experi-
ence squared, experience cubed, age squared, age cubed, total number
of children (NCHILD), presence of preschool children in the household
(CHILD6), dummies for single-person household (SINGLE), for one-
parent household (ONEPAR) and for other household situation (room-
19
This variable was computed as the sum of interest and dividend income, net
capital gains, property income, alimony, and retirement income (no earnings test).
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mate, grandparent, friend, etc) (OTHD)
20
, a dummy if the individual
reports that he would have preferred to work more annual hours in the
regular market at his ongoing wage rate (RATION), and a dummy if the
individual reports that his family and social circle would not disapprove
if they found out that he worked in an irregular job (REAC).
21
The variables included in the vector z in equation (10) are also used
as instruments. After considerable experimentation, the variables DSEX
(female=1), AGE, regional dummies for the region of Montreal (MON-
TREAL) and for the region of Bas-St-Laurent (BAS ST-LAUR) were
included in z.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
regressions. As compared with the average consumer in the full sample,
consumers of irregular goods and services report, on average, a higher
disposable income and work more hours in both labor sectors. In par-
ticular, their hours of work in the irregular labor sector are almost four
times those observed for the average consumer in the full sample. The
proportion of women who purchase irregular goods and services is lower
than that of men. Indeed, while there are 56.1% of women in the full
sample, there are only 50% of women in the sample of individuals who
purchase irregular commodities. Furthermore, the proportion of under-
ground consumers is somewhat lower in the region of Montreal and in the
region of Bas St-Laurent than in the region of Quebec. Finally, 61.1% of
respondents in the full sample think that their family and social circle
would not disapprove if they found out that he/she had an irregular job
(see variable REAC).
In Table 3, we present the parameter estimates of the expenditures
on irregular goods and services. The rst three columns report results
for the full sample. The fourth and fth columns report results for the
sample conditional on positive consumption.
After some experimentation, a specication that is linear in the log of
disposable income and in all other variables was used. This specication
proved to be very robust to the choice of variables, the scaling of variables
and the choice of instruments. Quadratic and interactive terms in h
u
,
h
r
and logm never turned out to be statistically signicant. Other more
general specications were also estimated, including the AIDS specica-
tion, but diculties of convergence were encountered. In fact, given the
20
The residual household category is individual living with parent(s).
21
A natural reaction to the use of this latter instrument is that it is likely to be
correlated with the error term of the conditional demand function. Indeed, if an
individual's family or social circle tolerates underground work, they are likely to
tolerate underground consumption. However, when also introduced directly as an
explanatory variable in equation (10), the variable (REAC) was never signicant in
any specication.
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small number of observations on positive expenditures, we did not have
enough variability in the sample to estimate more complex functional
forms.
The rst column presents the results from a standard tobit model
under the assumption that all the independent variables are exogenous.
Except for the Montreal region variable, the other variables in this re-
gression are statistically signicant (at the 5% or the 10% level). In
particular, the propensity to consume irregular commodities is lower for
women than for men. The parameter estimates associated with hours
of work in the regular and the irregular sectors are both positive and
signicant, with the coecient of h
u
(=1.47) much greater than the one
associated with h
r
(=0.108).
The second column provides the NLLS estimates of the EF model.
Qualitatively, the signs of all coecients are similar to those obtained
for the tobit (except for the DSEX variable, which is not signicant),
but the NLLS estimates are larger (in absolute value) than those of the
tobit. The coecients associated with the income variable (in logs) are
similar (3.2 vs 4.3). Also, as in the tobit, the coecient of h
u
(=4.64) is
larger than the coecient h
r
(0.459). While the value of these coecients
exceed those of the tobit, their ratio is similar.
The tobit and the NLLS estimates are not consistent if some right-
hand side variables are endogenous. The GMM estimates of the EF
model, which take into account the endogeneity of the hours of work
and the income variables, are reported in the third column. Before dis-
cussing the results, let us focus on an exogeneity test of these variables.
For this matter, we use a standard Hausman test based on a comparison
between GMM and NLLS estimators. This is an appropriate test since
under the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the independent variables,
the NLLS estimator is more ecient asymptotically than the GMM es-
timator but loses consistency under the alternative hypothesis. On the
other hand, the GMM estimator is asymptotically less ecient than the
NLLS estimator under the null hypothesis but remains consistent under
the alternative hypothesis. The test statistic, provided in Table 4, is
81.83 and is to be compared with the critical value of the 
2
with 9
degrees of freedom at the 5% level (=16.92). Therefore we easily reject
exogeneity.
22
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We also performed a Hausman test based on a comparison between GMM and
tobit estimators. We also concluded that exogeneity is rejected. Note that the latter
test is valid only under the maintained hypothesis of no measurement error on the
positive value of the dependent variable, since the tobit model is not robust to this
hypothesis.
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In Table 4, we also report Hansen's statistic in order to perform a
joint test of the validity of our instruments and of our overidentifying
restrictions. We conclude that these hypotheses are not rejected at the
5% level. Also, in the upper part of Table 6, we present a sensitivity
analysis of the GMM results for the EF estimator to various choices of
instruments: exclusion of the RATION variable, of the NLINC variable
and of the EDUCATION dummies; inclusion of the INCAP variable, a
dummy variable =1 if the individual reports to have been absent from
work due to sickness or accident over the year. A glance at the results
shows that they are quite robust with respect to the choice of these
instruments. Therefore, our analysis focuses on the GMM estimates
provided in Table 3.
Each of the GMM estimates of the hours of work variables in the
regular and the irregular sectors is statistically signicant. Therefore
we reject the joint hypothesis of separability and of the absence of both
a network eect and a resource eect in the underground sector. We
also reject the separability hypothesis in the regular sector. In Table 4,
both a Wald test and a Newey-West (1987) test indicate that we reject
the hypothesis that the coecients associated with the hours of work in
the regular and irregular sectors are jointly equal to zero.
23
Moreover, a
Wald test rejects the equality of the eects of the hours of work variables.
In fact, the coecient on hours of work in the underground sector (=
2:55) is 31 times larger than the coecient of hours of work in the regular
sector (= 0:082). This result conrms a much larger eect of labor supply
in the underground sector on the level of expenditures on underground
commodities. Interestingly, the coecient of the variable of hours of
work in the irregular sector is smaller than the corresponding one based
on NLLS. This indicates that part of the observed correlation between
this variable and the consumption in the irregular sector is due to the
presence of unobserved variables that aect both variables in the same
direction. Finally, the coecient associated with the disposable income is
positive and signicant at the 5% level, which implies that consumption
in the irregular sector is a normal composite good.
The two last columns provide the estimation results based on the
CEF. Nonlinear least squares estimates are presented in the fourth col-
umn while GMM estimates are reported in the last column. Based on a
23
The Wald statistic is based on the same formula as the one used in the context
of maximum likelihood estimation. The Newey-West test is the counterpart of the
likelihood ratio test in the context of GMM estimation. The statistic used to perform
the test is equal to the dierence in the values of the criterion to be minimized for
GMM estimation when the constraints to be tested are imposed and when they are
not. It is distributed as a 
2
with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of
constraints (=2).
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Hausman test with a value of 49.62 (see Table 4), the exogeneity of the
explanatory variables is again strongly rejected. Therefore, we concen-
trate the discussion on the GMM estimator.
As in the case of the GMM results based on the EF, we performed
a set of hypothesis tests. Hansen's test (with a test statistic of 8.14)
does not reject the validity of the instruments and of the overidentifying
restrictions. Moreover, based either on a Wald test (statistic of 14.18)
or a Newey-West test (statistic of 6.27), we reject the hypothesis that
hours of work in both regular and irregular sectors have no eect on
expenditures in the irregular sector. From a Wald test with a statistic
of 7.45, we also reject the hypothesis of the equality of the eects of
hours of work in each sector. In short, all these tests based on the CEF
estimator conrm those performed using the EF estimator. Sensitivity
analysis presented in the lower part of Table 6 also conrms that the
estimates are robust to the choice of instruments.
Under the assumptions made in the previous section, both the EF
and the CEF estimators obtained from GMM should be consistent even
in the presence of measurement errors on uncensored observations of
the dependent variable.
24
However, given that the EF estimator uses
more information than the CEF estimator (since the former uses the
full sample while the latter uses a truncated sample), one should expect,
on intuitive grounds, the EF estimator to be asymptotically more e-
cient than the CEF estimator. However, Stapleton and Young (1984)
were unable to show that this is necessarily the case.
25
Comparing re-
sults from the third and the fth columns of Table 3, one observes that
they are qualitatively similar when the estimates are signicant in both
regressions. Quantitatively, however, there are some dierences worth
emphasizing, especially concerning key economic variables. Thus the
coecient on log-income is negative based on the CEF estimator, sug-
gesting that underground consumption is an inferior composite good.
However, the coecient is not statistically signicant with a t-value of
0.92. The coecients on the hours of work variables are still positive
and signicant. Moreover, the coecient of hours of work in the under-
ground sector is still larger than the one of hours of work in the regular
sector and this dierence is statistically signicant, as suggested by the
Wald test reported in Table 4. However, it is considerably smaller than
the dierence estimated using the EF estimator. Indeed, based on the
24
One must also assume that the expectation of the measurement error is zero and
that its higher moments are bounded [see Stapleton and Young (1984)].
25
One reason is that the variance of the dependent variable may be larger in the
full sample than in the truncated sample, for certain values of the coecients and of
the independent variables.
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CEF estimator, the eect of hours of work in the irregular sector is only
3.1 times the one of hours of work in the regular sector. Despite some
quantitative dierences, these results conrm that labor supply in the
underground sector has a dominant positive eect on the consumption
of irregular commodities. This holds even when one takes into account
the endogeneity of labor supply variables, due for example to a positive
correlation between unobservable tastes for working and for consuming
in the underground sector.
One could speculate that the dierence between the EF and the CEF
estimators is partly due to the fact that the latent models which deter-
mine the probability of consuming irregular commodities and the level
of positive consumption are not the same. A natural explanation is the
existence of xed participating costs of consuming irregular commodi-
ties (e.g., xed costs of access to the underground sector). Indeed, these
costs will negatively aect the probability of consuming irregular com-
modities but will have a positive inuence on the level of consumption, as
long as it is a normal good.
26
The existence of substantial participating
costs, however, should also imply a minimum level of expenditures on
underground commodities by the consumers of these commodities. This
implication is not supported by the data, as shown in Figure 1 which
plots the frequency distribution of expenditures on underground goods
and services in the restricted sample. Indeed, one does not observe an
important discontinuity of this distribution at a level corresponding to
no expenditures.
What are the eects of changes in the level of disposable income and
of hours of work in each sector on the expected level of expenditures in
the underground sector? Table 5 reports results from GMM estimates
of Table 3 applied both to the full sample and to the restricted sample.
All the results are calculated at the mean of the explanatory variables
for the full sample.
At the 5% level of signicance, the GMM estimates using the full
sample show that a 1% increase in the disposable income yields an in-
crease of $1.06 in the expected level of irregular consumption. The cor-
responding elasticity of irregular consumption with respect to disposable
income is 0.55, which implies that irregular consumption is a necessary
good. Based on the GMM estimates using the restricted sample, the
eect of disposable income on irregular consumption is negative but not
signicant. Furthermore, the eect of an annual increase of 100 hours
of work in the regular sector is to raise the expected irregular consump-
26
See Cogan (1981) for a classical analysis of the eect of xed costs on individual
choices applied to labor supply.
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tion by $8.20. For a similar increase in hours in the irregular sector, the
increase in irregular consumption reaches $254.80 (estimates based on
full sample). When using the estimates based on the restricted sample,
the eect rises to $37.10 for an annual increase of 100 hours in the reg-
ular sector while it declines to $114.90 for hours of work in the irregular
sector. While the dierence between these two eects gets smaller (in
absolute value), working additional hours in the irregular rather than
in the regular sector still produces a much higher impact on irregular
consumption.
6 Policy Simulations
Our results raise important policy issues. Indeed, government policies
which aect the supply of irregular activities will also inuence the de-
mand for these activities. If the latter eect is neglected, one is likely to
underestimate the impact of the policy on the size of the underground
economy. To illustrate, assume that the government succeeds in reducing
the level of hours worked in the irregular sector by 1% at given wages and
prices level.
27
Dierentiating the log of eq.(10) with respect to h
u
and
using the denition of the gross disposable income, m, the eect of this
policy on the irregular expenditures of the representative underground
worker, is given by:
d log C
u
= [
C
u
;h
u
+ 
C
u
;m
(w
u
h
u
=m)] d log h
u
; (17)
where 
i;j
is the elasticity of i with respect to j.
The representative underground worker works 339 hours per year in
the underground sector; his irregular expenditures are $817, his gross
disposable income is $10 739 and his underground labor income is $2
732. Using this information and the coecients of table 5, one nds
that a 1% decrease in his irregular hours of work induces him to reduce
his irregular expenditures by a percentage varying between 0.53% and
1.09%, depending on whether one uses the GMM coecients based on
the restricted sample or the full sample. One should note that these g-
ures depend essentially on the network and the non-separability eects,
since the income eect is very small. Indeed, if one assumes no income
eect, these gures will be very close to those already obtained, varying
between 0.476% and 1.06%.
28
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The government could reach this objective by adopting more severe enforcement
parameters which induces the underground workers to reduce their labor supply in
the underground economy.
28
In the analysis, one does not take into account the impact of the adoption of a
more severe enforcement system on the level of resources used by the worker to hide
19
Since the underground expenditures made by the underground work-
ers represent 34.9% of total underground expenditures in the sample,
the impact of the policy on total underground expenditures will vary be-
tween 0.185% (=0.00530.349) and 0.38% (=0.01090.349) or 0.166%
and 0.37%, neglecting the income eect. To assess the importance of
this impact on the reduction in the size of the underground economy,
we need a model of the determinants of output in the underground sec-
tor. Consider, for simplicity, the following short run partial equilibrium
model of demand and supply for underground output:
Q
u
= Q
d
(H
u
; P
u
); (18)
H
u
=

H
u
h
s
(w
u
); (19)
Q
u
=

K
1 a
u
H
u
a
; with 0 < a < 1; (20)
H
u
=

K
u

w
u
aP
u

1=a 1
; (21)
where Q
u
and H
u
are respectively the market quantity of underground
output and of underground hours of work and

K
u
is the stock of capital,
assumed xed in the short run. The regular output is the numeraire
(P
r
= 1). Firms are assumed identical and their number is xed. Con-
sumers are also identical and receive a wage rate, w
u
. Income eects
are ignored for simplicity. Equation (18) is the market demand function
for underground output conditional on hours of work, with Q
d
H
u
> 0
and Q
d
P
u
< 0. Equation (19) is the underground labor supply, with
h
s
w
u
> 0. The variable

H
u
is the shift parameter, which is under the
government control. For simplicity, it is assumed that the relative price
of underground output, P
u
, does not aect the labor supply. Assum-
ing a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale, equation
(20) gives the market production function. Equation (21) is the prot-
maximizing market demand for hours of work consistent with the Cobb-
Douglas technology. There are four endogenous variables in this model:
Q
u
; H
u
; P
u
and w
u
.
Now let us study the impact of a change in the supply of underground
hours of work on the size of the underground economy. Dierentiating
the system with respect to the log of the shift parameter yields, after
some manipulations:
his irregular income. Moreover, we assume that hours of work in the regular sector
are not aected by the policy. Under the assumption that the individual adjusts
his hours of work in the regular sector so as to leave unchanged his total hours of
work, the impact on irregular expenditures will be smaller but still important, varying
between 0.282% and 1.02% (assuming no income eect).
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@ log (P
u
Q
u
) =@ log

H
u
=
a (
d
  1) + 

d
(1 + 
s
(1  a)) + 
s
(a  )
; (22)
where 
d
and 
s
are respectively the absolute value of the price elasticity
of demand and supply and  is the elasticity of Q
d
with respect to H
u
:
The model is stable when the denominator of equation (22) is positive.
This will be the case if the induced eect of hours of work on the demand
for underground output is not too strong, that is, if  < a: This inequality
is assumed to hold in the analysis.
Equation (22) shows that if 
d
= 1 and  = 0, there is no impact
on the size of the underground sector associated with a shift of the
supply curve. The reason is that, in this case, the percentage change
in the price of underground output is equal to minus the percentage
change in the equilibrium underground output. If the demand elasticity
is smaller than 1  =a; the numerator of equation (22) will be negative.
In this case, the impact of a government policy which reduces by 1%
the supply of irregular hours of work will actually increase the size of
the underground sector. A price inelastic demand is unlikely, however,
given the possibility of substituting regular for irregular commodities.
Therefore, we will assume in the sequel that 
d
> 1 > 1  =a:
By ignoring the induced demand eect of a government policy which
aects the supply of underground output, one will underestimate its total
eect by the following percentage:
B =
(1 + 
s
)  
d
[
d
(1 + 
s
(1  a)) + 
s
(a  )] [a (
d
  1) + ]
> 0: (23)
From equation (23), one can show that the underestimation bias, B,
is positively related to the price elasticity of supply, 
s
, and the elasticity
of Q
d
with respect to Q
s
; : It also decreases with an increase in the price
elasticity of demand, 
d
:
In Table 7, we report the underestimation bias associated with ne-
glecting the direct impact on the demand for underground output of a
government policy which reduces by 1% the supply of irregular hours of
work. The simulations are conducted for dierent values of the elastici-
ties associated with equation (23). The elasticity of output with respect
to hours of work, a, which reects the share of labor income in the un-
derground economy, is set at 0.75. Two values for , corresponding to
those discussed above, are considered, 0.166 and 0.370.
The biases are important. Even with a low elasticity of supply, 
s

:5; and a large price elasticity of demand, 3  
d
 2; the bias still
21
ranges from 10% to 37.7%. As the elasticity of output with respect to
hours of work gets higher, the bias decreases but not very much. Thus
when a ! 1, it ranges from 7.66% to 32.4%. Finally, the bias reaches
100% when 
d
= 1 or when a! 0.
These results show that the induced demand eect signicantly raises
the eciency of a successful intervention by the government authorities
of reducing the underground labor supply. Similarly, a decrease in the
marginal income tax rates that reduces irregular labor activities is likely
to have a signicant negative impact on the demand for underground
commodities.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the relation between work in the ir-
regular sector and the level of irregular expenditures. At the theoretical
level, we have shown that this eect can be decomposed into a network
eect, a non-separability eect and an income eect. The network eect
is due to the fact that an underground worker is likely to benet from a
reduction in information costs as a buyer of irregular commodities. We
have thus estimated a model of irregular expenditures including hours
of work in both the regular and the irregular sectors as explanatory
variables. Endogeneity of these variables as well as selectivity and mea-
surement error on the dependent variable are controlled through GMM
techniques. The estimations use micro data from a randomized survey
carried out in three regions of the Province of Quebec during 1993. Our
results clearly show that, ceteris paribus, individuals who work in the
underground economy are more likely to buy goods and services in the
underground sector. Moreover, the network and the non-separability ef-
fects are much stronger than the standard income eect. We have also
found a positive but much weaker relation between work in the regular
sector and expenditures on irregular goods. These results have a number
of implications both theoretically and for policy.
First, our results show that general equilibrium analysis of the un-
derground economy must take into account the interactions between the
demand and the supply sides due to the presence of network and non-
separability eects. To our knowledge, all existing general equilibrium
models impose separability between irregular labor supply and consump-
tion and ignore network eects.
The results also have implications both for tax policy and for the
system of enforcement. In particular, our empirical ndings show that,
in the presence of a network eect, the impact of changes in enforce-
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ment parameters (e.g., penalties on tax evasion, expenditures to detect
irregular activities) which reduce irregular hours of work are likely to be
much stronger on the size of underground economy. The basic reason is
that the network eect tends to generate a positive correlation between
changes in demand and changes in supply on the underground markets.
Thus if individuals who are caught working in the underground econ-
omy not only reduce their labor supply in this sector but also sharply
decrease their expenditures of irregular commodities, the eciency of
the enforcement policy is likely to be greatly enhanced. Ignoring the
latter eect induces signicant underestimating biases in the assessment
of the impact of the policy on the size of the underground economy.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics on Expenditures
on Irregular Goods and Services
Full sample Restricted sample
(C
u
 0) (C
u
> 0)
Number Expenditures

Number Expenditures

Hours of Work, Regular sector
None: h
r
= 0 577 162 62 1507
(1369) (3955)
Positive: h
r
> 0 992 209 174 1196
(878) (1796)
Hours of Work, Underground sector
None: h
u
= 0 1440 136 183 1071
(704) (1705)
Positive: h
u
> 0 129 817 53 1990
(2899) (4280)
All observations 1569 192 236 1277
(1084) (2540)
Standard errors are in parentheses.

1993 Canadian dollars.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics on Independent
and Instrumental Variables
Variable Denition Descriptive Statistics
Full Restricted
Sample Sample
(C
u
 0) (C
u
> 0)
Endogenous Variables
m Disposable Income (Can $) /1000 13.961 18.048
(23.012) (23.796)
h
r
Hours of work, regular sector /100 8.136 10.367
(8.558) (8.977)
h
u
Hours of work, irregular sector /100 0.279 0.979
(1.602) (3.398)
Exogenous or instrumental
variables
DSEX female = 1 0.561 0.500
AGE Age (in years) 35.538 34.051
(17.404) (15.154)
NCHILD Number of children 0.244 0.326
(0.665) (0.755)
CHILD6 Household with preschool child 0.041 0.051
MONTREAL Montreal region 0.401 0.424
BAS ST-LAUR Region of Bas St-Laurent 0.199 0.136
SINGLE Single person household 0.326 0.284
ONEPAR One-parent household 0.166 0.203
OTHD Other household situation 0.124 0.161
(roomate, grandparent, friend)
PRIMEDU Primary education 0.114 0.055
COLLEDU College education 0.293 0.331
UNIVEDU University education 0.247 0.352
NLINC Nonlabor income (Can $) /100 1.048 1.292
(4.660) (6.223)
RATION Feels constrained in 0.397 0.496
the number of hours of work
in regular sector (yes = 1)
REAC Reaction of own social circle 0.611 0.797
towards working in the underground
sector (does not disapprove = 1)
EXP Years of experience 11.611 11.904
(11.926) (10.736)
INCAP Absence from work due to 0.211 0.241
sickness or accident (yes = 1)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Excluded categories: Quebec region; respondent living with parent(s);
secondary education.
Table 3
Parameter Estimates of
Expenditures on Irregular Goods and Services
Full sample Restricted sample
(C
u
 0) (C
u
> 0)
Tobit NLLS GMM NLLS GMM
Intercept -4.118 -4.927 -0.993 -1.225 1.933
(0.298) (1.072) (0.517) (0.666) (2.668)
DSEX (Female = 1) -0.085 0.274 -0.038 -0.290 -0.703
(0.043) (0.206) (0.031) (0.089) (0.575)
AGE -24.81 -63.33 18.84 12.15 29.81
(13.92) (69.56) (13.14) (3.14) (19.76))
MONTREAL -0.062 -4.339 -0.038 -0.074 -0.084
(0.042) (0.564) (0.037) (0.092) (0.227)
BAS ST-LAUR -0.237 -1.090 -0.112 -0.129 -0.196
(0.063) (0.479) (0.054) (0.140) (0.293)
log m /100 3.285 4.305 1.060 1.871 -2.784
(0.319) (1.030) (0.515) (0.757) (3.038)
h
r
0.108 0.459 0.082 0.106 0.608
(0.026) (0.100) (0.041) (0.056) (0.347)
h
u
1.47 4.64 2.55 2.50 1.88
(0.06) (0.029) (0.49) (0.13) (0.90)
 0.317 0.724 0.032 0.315 0.747
(0.004) (0.187) (0.136) (0.509) (0.589)
log-likelihood 740.4
GMM value of function 11.7 8.14
NLLS value of function 1529.1 1364.8
Number of observations 1569 1569 1569 236 236
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Quebec region is the excluded variable.
Instruments: INTERCEPT, DSEX, AGE, AGE2, AGE3, NCHILD,
CHILD6, MONTREAL, BAS ST-LAUR, SINGLE, ONEPAR, OTHD,
PRIMEDU, COLLEDU, UNIVEDU, NLINC, NLINC2, RATION,
REAC.
Table 4
Specication Tests
Full Restricted Diagnostic
sample sample
(C
u
 0) (C
u
> 0)
Hausman tests
GMM vs NLLS 81.83 49.62 reject H
0

2
:05
(9) = 16:92
GMM Tests
Hansen 11.65 8.14 Do not reject

2
:05
(10) = 18:31

h
u
= 
h
r
= 0 :
Wald 28.12 14.18 reject H
0
Newey-West 11.06 6.27 reject H
0

2
:05
(2) = 5:99

h
u
= 
h
r
:
Wald 15.40 7.45 reject

2
:05
(1) = 3:84
Table 5
Marginal Eects of Key Variables on the
Consumption of Irregular Goods and Services
GMM Estimates GMM Estimates
Using Full Sample Using Restricted Sample
Log Disposable income 106.04 -170.0
(205.57) (-85.1)
Hours of work, regular sector 0.082 0.371
(0.042) (0.153)
Hours of work, irregular sector 2.548 1.149
(0.497) (0.792)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 6
Sensitivity Analysis of GMM Estimates
to the Choice of Instruments
log of Disposable Hours of work, Hours of work, GMM value
income regular sector irregular sector of function

Instruments
Full sample (C
u
 0)
Excluded:
Ration 135.2 0.116 2.65 10.40
(90.5) (0.061) (0.059)
Non-Labour Income 170.0 0.057 2.06 14.56
(80.5) (0.040) (0.049)
School dummies 105.3 0.167 2.85 8.38
(71.0) (0.083) (0.72)
Included:
Incap 105.4 0.084 2.58 11.49
(55.5) (0.048) (0.052)
Restricted sample (C
u
> 0)
Excluded:
Ration -225.1 0.478 1.74 6.17
(268.1) (0.265) (0.80)
Non-Labour Income -148.0 0.616 1.88 7.60
(632.0) (0.594) (1.11)
School dummies -293.3 0.693 2.66 6.20
(298.4) (0.365) (1.07)
Included:
Incap -248.0 0.608 1.87 8.25
(288.2) (0.369) (0.92)
Standard errors are in parentheses.

H
0
is accepted in all cases.
Table 7
Underestimation Bias on Underground
Output Associated with a 1%
Decrease in Irregular Hours of Work

s
n 
d
1 1.5 2 3
0 1.00 0.306 0.181 0.100
1.00 0.497 0.330 0.198
0.5 1.00 0.335 0.207 0.119
1.00 0.542 0.377 0.237
1 1.00 0.351 0.223 0.133
1.00 0.568 0.406 0.263
1.5 1.00 0.361 0.234 0.142
1.00 0.584 0.426 0.283
2 1.00 0.368 0.242 0.149
1.00 0.596 0.440 0.297
3 1.00 0.378 0.252 0.159
1.00 0.611 0.460 0.316
First line :  = 0.166 (calculated from GMM
estimates based on restricted sample).
Second line :  = 0.37 (calculated from GMM
estimates based on full sample).
Figure 1
Distribution of Expenditures on Irregular Commodities
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